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STATEMENT OF INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
The Ethics Bureau at Yale,1 a clinic composed of fourteen law school students
supervised by an experienced practicing lawyer/lecturer, drafts amicus briefs in
cases concerning the professional responsibility obligations of lawyers and the
ethical conduct of judges; assists defense counsel with ineffective assistance of
counsel and other claims relating to professional responsibility matters; and offers
ethics advice and counsel on a pro bono basis to not-for-profit legal service
providers, courts and law schools.
The Ethics Bureau at Yale respectfully joins this brief as Amicus Curiae for
three reasons. First, it believes the duties of lawyers to maintain confidentiality and
preserve the attorney-client privilege are sacred obligations. Second, it believes that
allowing lawyers to testify with respect to privileged or confidential information
ultimately destroys the lawyer’s access to critical information essential to effective
representation. Third, any line drawing by the Courts as to the scope of the protection
for lawyer-client communications should be drawn to protect from disclosure the
former client’s address.
The Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“FACDL”) is a
statewide organization representing over 2,000 members, all of whom are criminal

The reference to Yale is for identification purposes only. The views expressed herein are not
necessarily the views of Yale University or its Law School.
1

1

defense practitioners. FACDL is a non-profit corporation whose goal is to assist in
the reasoned development of Florida’s criminal justice system. Its founding purposes
are: promoting study and research in criminal law and related disciplines, ensuring
the fair administration of criminal justice in the Florida courts, fostering and
maintaining the independence and expertise of criminal defense lawyers, and
furthering the education of the criminal defense community. The question presented
by the Court has deep implications for the attorney-client relationship between
FACDL’s members and the clients they represent.
The National Association for Public Defense (NAPD) is an association of
more than 14,000 professionals who deliver the right to counsel throughout all U.S.
states and territories. NAPD members include attorneys, investigators, social
workers, administrators and other support staff who are responsible for executing
the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, including regularly
researching and providing advice to clients on the immigration consequences of
specific convictions. We are the advocates in jails, in courtrooms, and in
communities and are experts in not only theoretical best practices, but also in the
practical, day-to-day delivery of services. Our collective expertise represents state,
county, and local systems through full-time, contract, and assigned counsel delivery
mechanisms, dedicated juvenile, capital and appellate offices, and through a
diversity of traditional and holistic practice models. NAPD provides webinar-based
2

and other training to its members, including training on the utmost importance of
protecting attorney-client confidentiality and privileged information. Accordingly,
NAPD has a strong interest in the issue raised in this appeal.
Founded in 1996, the Center for University of Miami Law School Ethics and
Public Service (“Center”) is a law school-housed interdisciplinary ethics education,
skills training, and community engagement program devoted to the values of ethical
judgment, professional responsibility, and public service in law and society. The
Center's goal is to educate law students to serve their communities as citizen lawyers.
The Center’s curriculum, environmental justice clinic, and programs primarily focus
on ethics education, professional training and community service. One of its
programs, The Professional Responsibility & Ethics Program (PREP), is an ABA
award-winning program that develops continuing legal education (CLE) legal ethics
training for the legal community. PREP combines the attributes of an ethics institute
and an ethics clinic, and has dedicated hundreds of student hours to public service
and has educated thousands of members of the Bench & Bar.
QUESTION PRESENTED BY THIS COURT
DOES THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE SHIELD A PUBLIC
DEFENDER FROM DISCLOSING THE ADDRESS OF A FORMER
CLIENT IN RESPONSE TO A SUBPOENA BY A LITIGANT IN A
SEPARATE CIVIL SUIT?
A. Introduction

3

Can Assistant Public Defender Stan Maslona, former counsel for Alex
Vasquez, be required to help Appellees sue his former client by testifying at a
deposition as to the former client’s last known address? That is the question
presented. And, standing alone, the information sought from the former lawyer—
the address—is, in the view of amici, privileged and its forced disclosure an assault
on the integrity of the lawyer-client relationship.
A fortiori, the much greater amount of information actually sought and
ordered produced—all documents identifying the client’s present address, his
addresses for the last three years, his employers, his telephone numbers and all his
contact information—represents a greater invasion of the privilege and would have
an even more deleterious effect on lawyer-client relations.
Amici present this brief in the hope that their perspectives on these matters
will provide the Court with a better understanding of how much is at stake in what
Appellees would have the Court condone as a trivial request.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The vigilant defense of the attorney-client privilege by the courts is critical to
preserving the integrity of the lawyer-client relationship. Accordingly, the
Appellees’ attempt here to secure the client information from the client’s lawyer
must be rejected with the same ardor as if the Appellees sought to swashbuckler
through the lawyer’s entire file. If the principle that lawyer-client communications
4

are sacrosanct were compromised in this case, the lessons from such a decision
would eviscerate the attorney-client privilege in its entirety. Amici hope that their
analysis will provide the Court with all of the constitutional, legal and practical
reasons it needs to reject the demand for disclosure out of hand.
ARGUMENT
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE SHIELDS A PUBLIC DEFENDER
FROM DISCLOSING THE ADDRESS OF A FORMER CLIENT IN
RESPONSE TO A SUBPOENA BY A LITIGANT IN A SEPARATE CIVIL
LAWSUIT.
(i)

The Information Sought is Privileged
Appellees want to force Assistant Public Defender Maslona to divulge a

former client’s address. There is no question that this information is confidential
and, therefore, its voluntary disclosure by a current or former lawyer is absolutely
prohibited by Rule 4-1.6 of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct. Nevertheless,
Appellees contend that the information does not come within the attorney-client
privilege and, therefore, the lawyer can be forced to reveal it. Appellees’ argument
is deeply flawed and the decision below should be reversed.
Amici’s analysis begins with a focus on the importance of the privilege to
achieving trust between lawyer and client and a recognition of the broad definitions
that the courts have adopted for capturing that which must be considered privileged
if the benefits of the privilege are to be achieved. Privileged information is generally
considered to protect from forced disclosure communications between a lawyer and
5

a client, or the agents of either, made in confidence, for the purposes of providing or
receiving legal advice. As one court aptly put it, “the attorney-client privilege exists
to protect not only the giving of professional advice, but also the giving of
information to the lawyer to enable him to render sound and informed advice.”
Hagans v. Gatorland Kubota LLC, 45 So. 3d 73, 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citing
Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 390, 101 S. Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981)).
Indeed, the Hagans opinion went on to specify that this principle bars Appellees’
attempt to obtain privileged intake information:
The central issue presented here is whether the intake
documents prepared by Claimant’s attorney which
memorialized Claimant’s communications made for the
purpose of obtaining legal services are protected by the
attorney-client privilege. Allowing discovery of the
attorney’s intake documents would not only intrude into
work product, but would allow the adversary to function
on the wits and labor of an opponent. Such an
interpretation would be antithetical to the purposes
underlying the attorney-client privilege and would
additionally impose a chilling effect on an attorney’s
efforts to fully explore and memorialize the facts
underlying his client’s clause.
Hagens, 45 So. 3 at 76.
The information sought in this case fits neatly within those definitions. But
for the representation, Assistant Public Defender Maslona would not have obtained
the client’s address. And he did not seek and obtain his client’s address out of idle
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curiosity; he only sought and obtained the address in order to maintain
communication with the client to enable him “to render sound and informed advice.”
Lawyers have a fiduciary duty to communicate with their clients in a timely
and comprehensive manner. See Fla. Bar Reg. R. 4-1.3. The lawyer may not wait
for the client to ask for an update, but instead must promptly initiate communication.
See Fla. Bar Reg. R. 4-1.4. And in order to do so, that lawyer must know where and
how to contact the client, because many indigent defendants do not have reliable
telephone numbers or access to email.
Obtaining the client’s address is therefore critical to establishing and
maintaining a meaningful and productive lawyer-client relationship. Knowing the
client’s address ensures that the lawyer and the client will not be limited to
communications that are face-to-face at counsel’s office or, in the unlikely event that
the client has email, electronic. Rather, all generally-employed methods of
communication must be available, including correspondence, for, if face-to-face
communication were the only available alternative, the attendant expense and delay
would compromise the effectiveness of the representation.
These concerns are only heightened in attorney-client relationships that arise
in criminal cases, where the consequences of the representation, and any interference
whatsoever with the effective communication necessary to maintain the attorneyclient relationship, are so severe. Without the client’s address, the lawyer really
7

could not undertake to deliver competent legal services. See Fla. Bar Reg. R. 4–1.1.
As a result, when that address is found in the lawyer’s file, it is found there not as an
irrelevancy, but, rather, as a crucial facilitator of lawyer-client privileged
communications, thereby facilitating the rendition of legal services.
(ii)

Alleged Necessity Creates No Exception to the Privilege
From a review of the record it appears that the Appellees justify their

extraordinary request to seek the privileged information from the Public Defender
for Mr. Vasquez on their need to secure it. But this alleged need, even if it were
asserted only after the party seeking the privileged information had exhausted every
possible alternative source (a fact not present here), could never justify invading the
privilege. As this Court concluded in Coffey-Garcia v. South Miami Hospital, Inc.,
--- So. 3d ---, 2016 WL 3410415 (Fla. 3d DCA June 22, 2016) just last month:
It is of no account that the answers to such questions might
prove useful or even necessary to determine when the
Garcias discovered or should have discovered that there
was a “reasonable possibility” that medical malpractice
caused Samantha’s cerebral palsy. The hospital, clinics,
and doctors’ need for this information to prove their statute
of limitations defense does not justify an invasion of the
privilege. “[T]he attorney-client privilege . . . is not
concerned with the litigation needs of the opposing party.”
Genovese v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 74 So. 3d
1064, 1068 (Fla. 2011.) “[U]ndue hardship is not an
exception, nor is disclosure permitted because the
opposing party claims that the privileged information is
necessary to prove their case.” Id. (quotation and citation
omitted).
8

Id. at *4. The Hagans case reached the identical conclusion:
The attorney-client privilege is not subject to any
balancing test and, unlike matters protected by workproduct privilege, cannot be discovered by a showing of
need, undue hardship, or some other competing interest.
See Ehrhardt Florida Evidence, § 502.1 (2007 ed.) (citing
Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Dunn, 705 So.2d 605, 608
(Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (“Notwithstanding a litigant's
entitlement to work product material upon a showing of
need and undue hardship, the attorney-client privilege is
absolute.”)).
Hagens, 45 So. 3 at 76.
(iii)

The Intent of the Rule Amendments was to Protect Information
and Facilitate Communication

In their brief, Appellees cite several Florida cases for the proposition that a
lawyer’s knowledge of his or her client’s whereabouts is outside the privilege.
Specifically, Appellees rely on Burden v. Church of Scientology of California, 526
F. Supp. 44 (M.D. Fla 1981), to argue that the attorney-client privilege does not
apply to the identity of the client and the client’s address. But at the time these cases
were decided, the rules of professional conduct regarding confidentiality of
information were much narrower in scope.
The adoption on January 1, 1987 by the Florida Supreme Court of Rule 4-1.6
of the Rules of Professional Conduct signaled a dramatic change in the law,
specifically addressing the scope of the duty of confidentiality. In the view of Amici,
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two major expansions of what was to be considered confidential render cases
decided under the Code provision significantly less persuasive.
First, just like the then current ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility and the codes adopted by all of the states, the old Florida Code of
Professional Responsibility defined confidential information in a narrow way,
basically limiting the lawyer’s confidentiality obligations to the “confidences” and
“secrets” of a client. FLORIDA CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (FL. BAR
ASS’N 1975). See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stansbury, 374 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla.
5th DCA 1979).
Second, under the old Florida Code of Professional Responsibility, if the
client wanted any other information kept confidential, the burden was on the client
to ask the lawyer to do so. FLORIDA CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-2, 4-3
(FL. BAR ASS’N 1975) (using the language “[u]nless the client otherwise directs” to
define the scope of confidentiality under EC 4-2 and 4-3).
But the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct changed the definition so that
it is the lawyer’s ethical obligation to preserve all information related to the
representation, without regard to the effect of any disclosure or whether the client
requested that it be maintained in confidence. Fla. Bar Reg. R. 4-1.6 (“unless the
client gives informed consent” the lawyer must maintain confidentiality as to all
information learned in the representation, demonstrating that the burden is now on
10

the lawyer to preserve confidential information unless he or she obtains consent from
the client). This expansion signifies an intent to broaden the scope of confidential
information in order to better facilitate legal representation.
(iv)

Forcing Lawyers and Clients to Parse Distinctions Between
Confidential and Privileged Information Undermines the LawyerClient Relationship

Amici are of the view that exploring the public policy reasons why the
privilege must apply will demonstrate why the ruling below undermines the lawyerclient relationship. When lawyers meet with their clients for the first time to lay the
foundation for the lawyer-client relationship, one of the key elements that
introduction always includes is the lawyer’s explanation to the client of two key
matters. First, the lawyer emphasizes the importance of learning everything the
lawyer needs to know about the client’s circumstances. See Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice
or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the
lawyer’s being fully informed by the client”).

Part of the fiduciary duty of

competence and diligence is full investigation of the facts and circumstances of the
matter. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (the privilege “rests
on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client’s
reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out”).
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Second, in order to facilitate full disclosure, the lawyer must explain how the
lawyer will keep the client’s communications confidential pursuant to Rule 4-1.6
and not share that information with anyone without the client’s informed consent.
Fla. Bar Reg. R. 4-1.6(a).

This requirement exists because confidentiality

encourages and facilitates full disclosure. Fla. Bar Reg. R. 4-1.6 cmt. Lawyers
explain these core aspects of the lawyer-client relationship to clients up front because
the attorney-client privilege developed from two fundamental principles: that good
legal assistance requires full disclosure of a client’s legal problems, and that a client
will only reveal the details required for proper representation if his or her
confidences are protected. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
The order below, if left standing, would require lawyers to undertake a
confusing and self-defeating explanation, warning the client that, if ever called to
testify, the lawyer could be required to disclose any information learned that is
merely confidential, but not privileged. In response to this Court’s invitation, the
Florida Bar refused to provide amicus curiae assistance to this Court based on its
view of a strict demarcation between confidentiality and the attorney-client
privilege. However, the reality is that even the practicing bar often does not
understand the distinction between these two concepts. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Par
Four P’ship, 638 So. 2d 1050, 1050 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (“Confidential
communications between lawyers and clients are privileged from compelled
12

disclosure to third persons”); see also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.502(2). It necessarily
follows that it is totally unrealistic to expect clients to understand the difference.
Rather, clients would perceive such a warning for what it is: confusing and
disturbing evidence that the lawyer is offering the client protection with one hand
and taking it away with the other, undermining the client’s trust along the way.
The ruling below, therefore, strikes at the heart of the attorney-client
relationship. The idea that courts can force lawyers to be witnesses against former
clients, and, more specifically, can require lawyers to divulge confidential
information to the former clients’ detriment, whether or not that information is
subject to the attorney-client privilege, renders the very essence of a meaningful
lawyer-client relationship a nullity. Neither the client nor the lawyer will be able to
differentiate on a sentence-by-sentence or word-by-word analysis whether a
particular communication falls within the privilege or is “merely” confidential. The
order below opens lawyers’ files and lays bare their memories to invasion by third
parties, even adversaries of the client, who can then claim an entitlement to wield an
Exacto knife to cut out chunks of information that are confidential, but not attorneyclient privileged, and use that information against former clients. The idea that a
lawyer would be forced to testify against a former client on a surgically precise
differentiation between that which is privileged and that which is confidential would,
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in effect, destroy the very protection for communications between lawyer and client
that the privilege was designed to provide.
This case calls to mind the policy reflected in the wise decision of the court in
Purcell v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 424 Mass. 109, 676 N.E. 2d 436
(1997), a case many ethics professors teach. In Purcell the client came to the lawyer
seeking legal advice about a landlord tenant problem. Id. at 110. At the end of the
meeting, the lawyer concluded that the client might try to burn down his landlord’s
building. Id. The lawyer, scared that the client might actually wreak havoc, called
the police who arrested the client in possession of items that could be used in such
an endeavor. Id.
The client was charged with attempted arson and the lawyer was subpoenaed
to testify at the client’s retrial regarding the lawyer-client conversation, including
the threat. Id. The client claimed privilege and the District Attorney responded that
the “conversation” could not be privileged because it was either subject to the crime
fraud exception or otherwise not privileged because the lawyer was not being
consulted for advice about the planned arson. Id. at 111-112.
The court rejected the first argument because there was no evidence that the
client had consulted the lawyer seeking legal advice regarding his threatened
criminal conduct. Id. at 113. The court then rejected the district attorney’s second
fallback argument that there was an excluded middle category between crime-fraud
14

and privileged communication about which the lawyer could be forced to testify. Id.
at 116. Rather, the court concluded that if the lawyer-client communication did not
fall within the crime-fraud exclusion, it had to be privileged. Id. In the Court’s
opinion, it was more important to encourage lawyers to come forward to prevent
reasonably certain death or serious bodily harm, without discouraging the lawyer’s
intervention with the possibility that the lawyer could be “rewarded” for the
disclosure by being forced to testify in a criminal trial about the lawyer-client
communication. Id.
So too here, it is far more important to encourage communication between
lawyer and client, than have such communications inhibited by the thought that the
lawyer could be turned into an instrumentality of the client’s adversary because the
content of a lawyer-client communication was confidential, but not privileged.
Indeed, in some ways the argument is stronger here. In Purcell, the lawyer was free
to disclose, as he did, the possibility of arson because of an exception to the
confidentiality rule to disclose client confidences to prevent criminal conduct. Here,
there is no exception to the Florida confidentiality rule that would permit voluntary
disclosure of the address.
(v)

Why Stop There?
Amici are deeply concerned that if this Court requires former counsel to testify

about the address of his former client and thereby become the instrumentality for
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forcing the client to defend a lawsuit for which he otherwise might never be served,
it will lead to further invasion of the lawyer-client relationship. After all, in the
lawyer’s memory or in the lawyer’s file will be a great deal of information that falls
into the category of confidential, but not privileged. In permitting such an exercise
to take place, the outcome would be that lawyers would fail to learn important
information regarding their clients, including information that was just helpful in
gaining trust, but arguably outside of the scope of legal advice.
Of course, if we want to make discovery more efficient we would simply
permit each side to depose the other side’s lawyer. Would there be a treasure trove
of information forthcoming? Of course there would. But we do not allow it because
to do so would destroy the lawyer's role.
This policy is reflected in the jurisprudence surrounding the attorney-client
privilege. While nothing about the privilege would prevent the former client from
being deposed about his address, what the privilege enjoins, without exception, is
any attempt to force either client or lawyer to testify about the communications
between them. As a result, if the client is deposed, the client can be asked to reveal
his address; but the client cannot be asked whether he gave his lawyer the address,
nor may the lawyer be asked if he received it, or disclose what it is. See Upjohn Co.
v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (explaining client cannot be compelled to answer
question, “What did you say or write to the attorney?” but may not refuse to disclose
16

any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because such fact was included in his
communication to his attorney); see also Brookings v. State, 495 So. 2d 135, 139
(Fla. 1986) (“Appellant's contention that Lowery’s testimony against appellant
waived her attorney-client privilege is erroneous. We hold that the mere fact that a
witness-client testifies to facts which were the subject of consultation with counsel
is no waiver of the privilege. It is the communication with counsel which is
privileged, not the facts.”).
The lawyer can only gain the rapport that is required to create a healthy
lawyer-client relationship if the client knows that the lawyer can be trusted with the
client’s fondest hopes and greatest fears, that the lawyer will be the client’s one true
champion, that the lawyer would never be forced to testify regarding
communications with the client unless the client waives the privilege on informed
consent or the communication comes within the crime fraud exception. See Fla. Bar
v. Knowles, 99 So. 3d 918, 922 (Fla. 2012) (citing R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.6 cmt.)
(stating that “[a] fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in
the absence of the client’s informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information
relating to the representation . . . [t]his [principle] contributes to the trust that is the
hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship”).
It may be that in the most extraordinary case a lawyer could be forced to
testify. But the rules clearly reflect an intent to bar the lawyer from testifying ever.
17

And all the policy reasons that create a strong bias against lawyers being forced to
testify urge the same result here. Having a lawyer serve as the facilitator for
whatever goal the former client’s adversary hopes to achieve is one to be avoided if
at all possible.
(vi)

Forcing a Public Defender to Testify Against a Former Client is
Especially Damaging

Many of the problems created by compelling lawyer testimony regarding
confidential information from a former client apply to any lawyer-client relationship.
Indeed, repeated studies have shown that full and open lawyer-client communication
is a top priority for clients. See, e.g., S.E. Schemenauer, What We've Got Here ... Is
a Failure ... To Communicate: A Statistical Analysis of the Nation's Most Common
Ethical Complaint, 30 Hamline L. Rev. 629 (2007).
The ill effects from forced disclosure of lawyer-client confidences are
exacerbated, however, in cases involving defendants who are assigned criminal
defense counsel because they cannot afford to hire lawyers. See Christopher C.
Campbell, et al., Unnoticed, Untapped, and Underappreciated: Clients’ Perceptions
of their Public Defenders, 33 Beh. Sci. & Law 751, 755-56, 760-61 (2015). Public
defenders already are engaged in a constant battle to overcome biases and low
expectations, which are summed up in the painful epithet “Public Pretender.” Cara
H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution to The
Nation's Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 Harv. J. on Legis. 487, 494 (2010) (describing
18

Florida exoneree’s description of state indigent defense bar). Indigent defendants
often believe that a public defender’s first loyalty is to the government that provides
the defender’s paycheck—the same government that is prosecuting the defendant.
Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had
A Public Defender, 1 Yale Rev. L. & Soc. Action 4, 7 (1971). Public defenders also
are expected—incorrectly—to provide lower-quality representation than retained
counsel. See, e.g., James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does
the Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122
Yale L. J. 154, 158-59 (2012).
In short, the public defender starts off the lawyer-client relationship with a
deep deficit in good will. As a result, public defenders must invest much more time
and energy than retained counsel in building a foundation of confidence and comfort
with clients. Campbell, et al., supra. Yet in filling this important need, under the
ruling below public defenders will simultaneously be increasing the risk to clients
as the quantum of confidential conversations grows. Thus, the ruling below infects
the lawyer-client relationship with profound, unhealthy, and unnecessary conflicting
concerns that undermine trust. This Court should nip that infection before it spreads
by reversing the ruling below.
(vii) The Fifth and Sixth Amendments Require the Communications to be
Privileged
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Amici have focused this entire brief on the question presented, to wit: whether
the information sought is privileged. But it is important to remember that the
attorney-client privilege, by protecting the “ability to speak freely to one's attorney[,]
helps to preserve rights protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to legal representation.” Mills v.
State, 476 So. 2d 172, 176 (Fla. 1985). Mills therefore puts an end to Appellees’
fishing expedition. Perhaps not every professional responsibility of lawyers to their
clients takes on a constitutional dimension.

But there is no doubt about the

fundamental federal constitutional rights that are implicated by the lawyer’s duty of
confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. Without both, the right to be free
from self-incrimination and the right to counsel would be hollow promises indeed
since nothing could compromise those fundamental rights in the way that would
occur if others could pry into the communications between lawyer and client.
CONCLUSION
It was an honor for amici to be asked to provide the Court with our views on
this matter. The importance of the fundamental protections provided by the privilege
and the duty of confidentiality are at the heart of the professional work each of the
amici undertakes. Our hope is that we have provided a different perspective that
will assist the Court in reaching the right result in this critical case.
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